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Legal Culture  
1. Term 
Legal culture has been intensively discussed in legal discussions over the last 
twenty years or so, especially in connection with the Europeanisation of private 
law. Often, national legal culture is simply viewed as an obstacle to → European 
private law; a European legal culture is viewed as its prerequisite. What is actually 
meant by legal culture often remains unclear:  legal culture is considered 
important, but an exact definition is not. Moreover, the problems bound up in the 
concept of culture, which related disciplines – especially anthropology and 
sociology – have tackled, are widely ignored. 
The term legal culture refers to multiple different ideas, which are not always 
sufficiently separated.  Legal culture often describes merely an extended 
understanding of law and is thus synonymous with „living law“ (Eugen Ehrlich) 
or „law in action“ (Roscoe Pound). Sometimes, the term legal culture is used 
interchangeably with the term → legal family or legal tradition. More specific 
concepts exist as well. Legal sociologists especially understand legal culture as 
the values, ideas and attitudes that a society has with respect to its law (Lawrence 
M. Friedman, James Q. Whitman). Sometimes legal culture itself is seen as a 
value and placed in opposition to the barbarism of totalitarianism (Peter Häberle); 
here, legal culture is used synonymously with the rule of law. Others understand 
culture as certain modes of thinking; they speak of episteme or mentalité (Pierre 
Legrand), legal knowledge (Annelise Riles) and collective memory (Niklas 
Luhmann), law in the minds (William Ewald) or even cosmology (Rebecca 
French, Lawrence Rosen). In addition, an anthropologically influenced 
understanding exists of legal culture as the practice of law (Clifford Geertz). 
Sometimes, borders are fluid, both among these concepts themselves and 
between them and other concepts such as legal ideology (Roger Cotterell) or legal 
tradition (H. Patrick Glenn, Reinhard Zimmermann). Some definitions bring 
different aspects together. Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, for example, 
name six elements:  legal terminology, legal sources, legal methods, theory of 
argumentation, legitimising of the law and common general ideology. A similar 
combination of disparate elements underlies the definition of the styles of legal 
families (Konrad Zweigert, Oliver Remien). 
2. Law and Culture 
An interrelationship between culture and law has long been postulated. Baron 
de Montesquieu postulated in his “Esprit des Lois” (1748) the necessity for 
positive law to be adapted to the geographical features of the country and the 
cultural characteristics of its people. In the 19th century the idea of law as the 
cultural accomplishment of a particular people (as well as the attempt to 
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determine the „spirit“ of particular law) became popular. At the same time, the 
term culture was also used for a higher stage in the development of law, which 
overcame the sectionalism of lower stages. When Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
explained law as a cultural achievement, what he had in mind was likely more a 
European legal culture of legal elites than a national “Volksgeist” limited to 
Germany. In the 20th century, Max Weber established a comparative cultural 
sociology of law and introduced with it the idea of rationality as culture, a core 
criterion for western law that still finds wide acceptance today, even though 
Weber saw considerable cultural differences within this western law, especially 
between civil law and common law. 
Legal culture stands between law and culture, with unclear borders in both 
directions. According to a widespread understanding, legal culture represents that 
cultural background of law which creates the law and which is necessary to give 
meaning to law. This encompasses the role of law in society, the role of different 
legal sources, the actual authority of different actors and institutions, etc. 
However, nearly all such elements can also be described as part of law (as long as 
law is not limited to legal rules). This confluence is not surprising:  Given that 
culture has traditionally been defined in opposition to nature, since the downfall 
of natural law, all law must necessarily be cultural. For the same reason, legal 
culture cannot sensibly be separated from law, and it is not entirely clear that the 
term legal culture provides analytical advantages over a broad and encompassing 
concept of law. 
Equally problematic is the relationship between legal culture and general 
culture. Legal culture is often viewed as that part of the culture which concerns 
itself with law. However, law is relevant in nearly all areas of life, so it is difficult 
to draw a sharp division between legal culture and general culture. More useful is 
the division between internal and external legal culture introduced by Lawrence 
M. Friedman (but already visible in Savigny). Internal legal culture describes the 
attitude towards law of legal actors such as judges and lawyers; external legal 
culture describes the attitude towards law of the general population. Legal 
sociologists frequently consider the external legal culture as more important; 
doctrinal lawyers, by contrast, focus more on internal legal culture. The more 
autonomous law is within the society, the more important internal legal culture 
becomes in comparison to external legal culture. Often, these analyses presume a 
relatively homogenous and static concept of culture: Culture is used with a view 
to a community (frequently a nation-state) and provides this group with its 
identity, by establishing internal coherence and external difference, as well as 
relative consistency over time. All of these elements – focus on the nation-state, 
internal coherence, external isolation, lack of change – have in the meantime 
become very doubtful in anthropology and sociology. Nevertheless, in the legal 
debate they are often still presumed to be self-evident (see infra 6).  
3. Relevance 
Legal culture is frequently viewed as the cause for certain characteristics of a 
legal system. For instance, that Swedish law is less systematic than German law is 
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supposedly caused by the German preference for order. That English 
constitutional law prioritises the businessman and French law prioritises the 
consumer (→ Consumers and Consumer Protection Law) supposedly reflects the 
different attitudes of the respective countries toward the free market. That U.S. 
procedural law is friendlier to plaintiffs than European law supposedly rests on 
different understandings of the role of law in society.  
Such conclusions are widespread but problematic. They presume that culture 
exerts influence on law, but they neglect that the reverse is also true, that law 
influences culture. They also overlook the difficulties of observing legal culture 
independently from law. In fact, this causal analysis is often circular. For 
example, → codification in civil law countries is sometimes explained as a 
reflection of the higher value civil law places on systematisation and 
completeness as opposed to common law (→ Legal Families, Doctrine of). At the 
same time, however, the proof that civil law countries prefer systematisation and 
completeness is found precisely in the fact that they are supposed to explain, 
namely, the fact that codification exists in civil law but not in common law 
systems. Cultural analysis like this can in the best case recognise coherence – a 
preference for order in law correlates with a similar preference in traffic – but not 
what is cause and what is effect. 
Legal culture is more important in explaining and predicting the effect of law 
on society, such as in the extent to which promulgated laws will be adhered to and 
judgments will be implemented. Whether legal reform will be successful depends 
to some degree on legal culture. That is especially relevant for legal transplants 
between legal systems with different legal cultures (→ Reception of Law). Some 
believe that such transplants are possible without problems only for legal norms 
that are largely independent of culture, though there is no unanimity about which 
legal norms are included – almost all (Alan Watson), almost none (Pierre 
Legrand) or only those of economic law in contrast to family and inheritance law 
(Ernst Levy). Culturally dependent legal norms are thought to be transferable only 
between legal systems with similar legal cultures. Newer studies have shown it 
more probable that the success of a legal transplant depends on the legal system of 
the receiving country and its culture (Otto Kahn-Freund, Daniel Berkowitz & 
Katharina Pistor). If, as is frequently the case, the transplanted legal norm or 
institution interacts with the recipient legal culture in other ways than it does with 
the donor legal culture (Gunther Teubner speaks in this context of legal irritants 
instead of legal transplants), this does not signify a failed transplant.  
Legal culture is also relevant for the creation of → uniform law. Even if the 
law of different states is formally unified, each state will likely adapt the unified 
law according to its respective legal culture. This can stand in the way of effective 
legal unification. The CISG (→ Sale of Goods, International [Uniform Law]), for 
instance, is interpreted differently in different legal systems. However, reciprocal 
effects can be found here as well: legal unification can also produce a unified 
legal culture. That was the case with the French Civil Code, which reconciled the 
Roman-law influenced culture of written law in the South (Roman law) with the 
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Germanic-law customary law in the North and spawned a French legal culture. 
Some hold similar hopes for a → European civil code. 
4. National Legal Cultures 
If one understands legal culture as applying not to individuals but to a group, 
legal culture requires a relatively homogenous group. Often, the nation-state is 
postulated as such a group; comparison is made between, for example, French and 
British legal culture (John Bell). Such inquiries often reveal substantial 
differences that arise, even between similar states: for example, the litigation rate 
in Germany is very high, in the Netherlands very low (Erhard Blankenburg). The 
institutional differences that are responsible for this – in the Netherlands many 
more alternative methods of alternative dispute settlement exist – need not, 
however, necessarily be described as culture. Be that as it may, studies have 
shown that attitudes and practices toward the law between nation-states have 
traditionally demonstrated large differences (James L. Gibson, Gregory A. 
Caldeira).  
European private law has long taken different national legal cultures into 
consideration. Especially in private law, harmonisation through → Directives was 
long preferred over unification through → Regulations because Directives enable 
every member state to reach a common goal within and in accordance with its 
respective national legal culture. Member states can establish limited exceptions 
to regulations promoting the → European internal market based on their own legal 
culture, especially in the form of national values as → public policy (ordre public) 
or as general interest. However, such invocations of national legal culture are 
subject to control and restrictions by Community Law. Finally, the discussion 
about a → European civil code shows the power of national legal cultures. The 
resistance against rules, many of which would not even be mandatory, is widely 
grounded in legal culture. In England there is the fear that a European codification 
would destroy the very different legal culture of the common law (a similar 
criticism was brought against the Europeanisation of private international law). In 
France and Germany there is the reverse fear: by replicating national codifications 
on the supranational level, a European codification will effectively rob national 
legal culture of its most important achievement.  
5. European Legal Culture 
Besides invocations of national culture, the view exists that a European legal 
culture is either already existent or is being created through the Europeanisation of 
law. Even more than is the case for nation-states, this makes it necessary to justify 
why Europe is the reference unit, in what way a common legal culture 
encompasses European nations on the one hand and distinguishes them from non-
European states on the other. The political and economic similarities between 
countries of the European Union are a somewhat arbitrary indicator for common 
legal culture because, for instance, Switzerland would then have to be left out.  
A more promising foundation lies in the common legal heritage of the ius 
commune. The ius commune was always more a legal method and legal culture 
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than a unified corpus of legal rules. This asserted historical foundation 
necessitates, on the one hand, demonstration that the differences between common 
law and civil law are not as strong as are widely believed. Such demonstration has 
been impressively achieved in recent studies on the doctrine and argumentative 
structures of private law. On the other hand, non-European legal systems have 
also been influenced by this tradition – especially those of North America and 
Australia, but also those on other continents. European legal culture in this sense 
has become western or even global (modern) legal culture, for which Europe is 
merely the origin, but no longer the centre of reference. 
Furthermore, European legal culture can be based on common European 
values. Here also the problem is to what extent such values are European or rather 
western. However, the emphasis on values makes it possible to distinguish 
European culture especially from that in the United States, because several 
elements of European culture are quite different from that in the United States: a 
less instrumental understanding of law, a stronger autonomous private law, 
stronger protections for the weaker party in contract law, stronger emphasis on 
human dignity and privacy, etc. 
Some scholars have suggested concrete criteria for European legal culture. 
Franz Wieacker names three relatively abstract elements of European legal 
culture, which he sees as historically invariable: personalism, legalism, 
intellectualism. Peter Häberle, who sees Europe first and foremost as a 
“community of legal culture,” enumerates six somewhat disparate criteria:  
historicism, scientific character of legal reasoning and doctrine, judicial 
independence, ideological and religious neutrality of the state, legal culture as 
both diversity and uniformity, and particularity and universality of European legal 
culture. Reinhard Zimmermann combines elements of both approaches and traces 
them back to the Roman law and Christian traditions. In addition to the tension 
between diversity and unity he names written character, rationality, adaptability, 
learned character, division between law and non-law (religion, morality), 
dominance of private law and centrality of the person.  
Sometimes the EU itself is said to have its own legal culture – or non-culture 
(which analytically is the same thing). What is meant by that is especially the 
style of EU law in comparison to that of the member states: its dynamic character, 
sector-specific structure, its market-based legitimacy, etc. Responsibility for this 
style is attributed to EU-civil servants, who on the one hand represent their own 
different national legal cultures and on the other hand are relatively homogenous 
in their positive attitude toward the EU. However, these Brussels bureaucrats are 
assisted in the compilation of European private law through the advice and work 
of national lawyers all over Europe. Insofar as an EU culture exists, it is unclear 
which societal groups it encompasses and with whose legal culture it could be 
contrasted. 
6. Criticism 
At the same time at which the term culture became popular in legal studies, it 
began to be questioned, at least as a general concept, in anthropology and 
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sociology, the fields from which legal studies adopted the term. Many of the 
problems that those fields recognised with the term culture are relevant also for 
legal culture, but many lawyers have not yet sufficiently recognised those 
problems.  
One major problem has already been mentioned: culture and legal culture are 
often used without exact definition and in relation to very different questions. 
Such vagueness not only puts the explanatory value of the term in question. 
Moreover, it creates the risk that an analysis of foreign law will be biased by 
stereotypes about the purported culture of that law  
A connected problem is that of essentialised culture. Often, a particular legal 
culture is asserted to exist and then for this reason alone deemed either deserving 
of protection or (less often) of rejection. A national codification, for instance, is 
thought worthy of preservation merely because it represents a cultural 
achievement. Such discussions of legal culture frequently have the potential to be 
quite conservative or even reactionary: changes are rejected with an often 
consciously irrational reference to legal culture. 
These problems stem from a conception of culture which has been found 
problematic. According to this conception, cultures are internally consistent, have 
relatively clearly defined borders, and are historically largely constant. Such a 
conception threatens to conceal differences within a particular legal culture while 
overestimating differences with other legal cultures. So it is, for instance, with the 
demarcation between civil and common law, which makes differences between 
them absolute while ignoring the considerable differences among individual civil 
law systems. Differences are often greater within individual legal systems than 
between them: the Milan partner of a large law firm has more in common with his 
colleague in Hong Kong than with a solo practitioner in his own city. New legal 
cultures emerge along functional differences, such as the global legal culture of 
arbitration (Yves Dezalay, Bryant G. Garth). In addition, a particular legal culture 
almost always faces internal tension. The values of a society, its way of thinking 
and its practices are constantly questioned in most societies. A unified legal 
culture is frequently claimed only by those who benefit from it. 
On these grounds, the presumption that legal culture is unchangeable is also 
problematic. Its development certainly displays a certain path dependency 
(Anthony Ogus). But, for example, German law has experienced so many 
disruptions between 1800 and today that one can speak of a unified legal culture 
only at a very high level of abstraction.  
On balance, the use of the term legal culture in general law and in European 
private law in particular is doubtful. The reason is not that legal culture describes 
something unimportant, rather that it describes inadequately something that is 
very important. Talk of legal culture can be helpful insofar as it sensitises us for 
important factors beyond legal rules and institutions: values, judicial knowledge, 
practices, etc. The term legal culture may sometimes be useful to refer to the 
aggregation of these factors, when the relationship between them is irrelevant. 
Otherwise, it is frequently more exact and productive, and less misleading, to 
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